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The Hospi tal Response: 
The Morality of the Civilian-Military 
Contingency Hospital System 
Gerald D. Coleman, S.S. 
An associate professor of moral and pastoral theology at St. 
Patrick's Seminary,- Menlo Park, California, Father Coleman holds a 
doctorate {rom the Institute of Christian Thought in Toronto. 
There is obviously no end to the debate and controversy regarding 
nuclear warfare.! 
The nuclear question sustains particular concern for the hospital 
systems in this country as they have been called upon to help create 
adequate preparation for the possibility of a war in the European 
arena. 
In his statement of Oct. 4, 1981, Archbishop John R . Quinn of San 
Francisco specifically focused on the question of this medical involve-
ment as preparedness for war. In the section of his pastoral letter, "St. 
Francis of Assisi; · Instruments of Peace - Weapons of War," entitled 
"Our Response," Archbishop Quinn wrote as a second area for con-
cern and response: 
.. . (S)ince many in the medical community are now convinced that it is 
dangerously deceptive to pretend there can be an effective medical response 
in the case of a thermonuclear attack, I urge the administrators and staff of 
Catholic Health Facilities to join all those who are vigorously opposing the 
intentions of the Department of Defense to establish a "Civilian-Military 
Contingency Hospital System" if this System is based on the illusion that 
there can be effective m edical response in the case of nuclear war. 2 
The key phrase here, of course, is " ... if this System is based on 
the illusion" of effective medical response to a nuclear war. This ques-
tion lies at the heart of the moral dilemma concerning hospital cooper-
ation in the Civilian-Military Contingency Hospital System (CMCHS). 
Maj. Michael C. Vojtasko is the deputy director of the CMCHS and 
he has responded to the question about "illusion" in very concrete 
terms: 
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The program has received the endorsement of the American Medical Asso-
ciation, American Hospital Association, and we are working closely with a 
number of other national health associations and groups such as the Ameri-
can College of Emergency Physicians. It is unfortunate that some groups, 
principally the Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR), have attempted 
to link the CMCHS program with nuclear war. Since the Department of 
Defense has never stated this as a planning premise of the program, the PSR 
alleges that this lack of association must mean that we are concealing our 
real purpose. While we share the concern of all health professionals regard-
ing the medical effects of nuclear war, and whether medical planning is even 
feasible for such an eventuality, we object strongly to the use of the CMCHS 
program as a vehicle to state an anti-nuclear policy. Attempts to do so 
demonstrate, at best, a misunderstanding of the program and puts in 
jeopardy the success of a logical, cost-effective system of care to Service 
members who may become casualties from a future conflict. 3 
Major Vojtasko's statement recognizes clearly the danger of nuclear 
war. At the same time, however, the statement exegetes the Civilian-
Miltary Contingency Hospital System as a program that is not aimed 
at preparedness for nuclear warfare. It seems evident that the Depart-
ment of Defense, cited here in Vojtasko's statement, is concerned 
about preserving the conditions that make possible the continuation 
of civilized life on earth. The question is answered as far as Vojtasko's 
comment here: the CMCHS is not a program aimed at care in the 
eventuality of a nuclear war. 
Civilian-Military Contingency Hospital System 
In order to sustain a better perspective on the hospital response to 
this program, it would be beneficial to outline the main elements 
involved in the CMCHS_ 
First of ali, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is 
an executive agency that serves as a single point of contact within the 
federal government for emergency management activities. It is ded-
icated to the establishment and maintenance of a comprehensive and 
coordinated emergency management capability in the United States to 
plan and prepare for, respond and recover from and, most impor-
\ 1 tantly, mitigate the effects of emergencies, disasters, and hazards 
ranging from safety and protection in the home to nuclear attack. 
Secondly, then, it is clear that the responsibility of the FEMA is to 
make adequate preparation for "nuclear attack." What is equally as 
clear, however, is that another option has been explored, a decision to 
move toward the civilian sector for relief in the case of a nuclear 
attack. 
The CMCHS represents a decision, then, to construct a system in 
peacetime which taps the civilian sector of hospital beds, facilities and 
.. manpower. The assumption of this program is that the CMCHS would 
be activated only in the event that military casualties generated in a 
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war abroad would exceed the Department of Defense and Veterans' 
Administration capability to care for these casualties. 
It seems logical to conclude that the CMCHS is part of an overall 
effort to prepare for any contingency so that American servicemen 
and women can be assured of adequate medical care under all circum-
stances. The obvious question, however, remains outstanding: if the 
FEMA functions as a federal agency to plan and prepare for the 
effects of a nuclear attack, why duplicate this effort in the CMCHS? 
One might respond to this question by stating that the object of 
the FEMA program is to care for casualties at home, whereas the 
CMCHS program is to care for the casualties suffered by American 
servicemen and women abroad. According to Vojtasko, however, the 
CMCHS does not assume that these casualties would arise from a 
nuclear contest. 
At this point, a brief history of the development of the CMCHS is 
in order. The theory was first introduced to members of Congress in 
the Spring of 1978, in Department of Defense testimony before Con-
gressional committees on the FY 1979 Appropriations Bill for the 
Department of Defense. 
In subsequent years, congressional leaders expressed interest in the 
progress of the program's development and implementation. In June 
of 1980, the General Accounting Office released a report to Congress 
on the results of its investigation of the program. The report recom-
mended that Congress mandate a Civilian Military -Veterans' Adminis-
tration Contingency Hospital System to meet the medical needs of 
U.S. military casualties in wartime. When Department of Defense rep-
resentatives visit a community to present the program to hospitals and 
medical leaders, a letter is sent to each member of that community's 
congressional delegation, inviting them to participate in the discussion. 
In brief, Congress has been well aware of the CMCHS program from 
its inception, and has had every opportunity to debate the issue and 
discuss the Department of Defense strategy of gaining support from 
the civilian community to care for wartime casualties. 
The initial public announcement of the CMCHS plan came in early 
1980, in an official Department of Defense press release. At that time, ( 
the release was picked up by the wire services as well as several major 
metropolitan newspapers throughout the country. The program then 
became widely publicized in major newspapers and magazines, tab-
loids and medical journals. 
Initial announcements were accompanied from the start by crit-
icism that the CMCHS was de facto assuming preparedness for nuclear 
warfare. This assumption has always been denied, however. Writing to 
the New York Times on Nov. 10, 1981, John F. Beary III, M.D., 
acting assistant secretary of the Department of Health Affairs, Wash-
ington, D.C., said: 
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With . . . protest against the CMCHS plan ... , groups are jeopardizing the 
care of wounded soldiers who might serve in a future conventional conflict, 
and therefore interfering with our national security . 4 
As stated and interpreted by the Department of Defense, therefore, 
the CMCHS program does not assume nuclear war preparedness; aims 
at supplementing the capabilities of the military health care field; 
involves the use of civilian hospitals and their delivery capabilities; and 
serves as a mechanism of preparedness to medically support a future 
conflict outside the United States. 5 
The Hospital Response 
There is a standard contract, a "Memorandum of Understanding," 
between the Department of Defense and a hospital which agrees to 
participate in the CMCHS program. 
This memorandum indicates in part in the first paragraph that: 
The weapons of modern warfare may now create heretofore unknown num-
bers of American casualties in a zone of war. This potential medical demand 
makes it imperative that the Secretary of Defense seek additional sources of 
medical care for U.S. servicemen and servicewomen in the time of a conflict. 
The memorandum then binds the participating hospital to agree 
that: 
.. . upon notification during a state of national emergency as declared by 
the President it will make available to the Department of Defense a 
minimum of 50 to a maximum of 80 beds with all necessary treatment and 
administrative processing as may be required for the patients hospitalized 
therein; and, for its part, the Department of Defense agrees to compensate 
at the hospital's regular charges ... for its patient care services at the time 
said services are provided. 
The final paragraph of the memorandum indicates that both the 
hospital and the Department of Defense will plan for the admission, 
treatment, hospitalization and discharge of the military patients and 
that the hospital will participate in an "annual exercise of CMCHS 
which will be approved by the Joint Commission on the Accreditation 
of Hospitals." 
There has been a growing discontent with the CMCHS program 
among hospitals, an anxiety which centers mainly on the assumption 
that the CMCHS plan is not a preparation for nuclear war. 
In October of 1981, the administrator of Queen of the Valley 
Hospital in Napa, California, retracted an earlier agreement to partici-
pate in the CMCHS program. The reason is clear: 
Out of concern for the international climate which increasingly seems to 
accept nuclear war as a "rational" possibility, I must use this as an oppor-
tunity to express . .. my opposition to the country's escalating race to pro-
duce weapons for nuclear war . . .. 
In December of 1981, the superior general, along with her Council 
of the Sisters of Mercy, Burlingame, California, issued a lucid state-
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ment directing health care facilities sponsored by the Sisters of Mercy 
of Burlingame to refrain from signing the CMCHS program. This direc-
tive is based on the belief that conventional war would inevitably 
escalate "to the use of ... tactical nuclear weapons." The statement 
here cites both John Moxley, M.D., assistant secretary of defense for 
health affairs and Secretary of State Alexander Haig as admitting the 
possibility that the "use of tactical nuclear weapons cannot and 
should not be ruled out" (Haig's statement). For the Sisters of Mercy, 
then, agreement with the CMCHS program fosters the illusion that 
nuclear war is an ethical option. 
Also in December of 1981, University of California officials noti-
fied the Department of Defense that they would not permit the uni-
versity's five major hospitals to reserve specific facilities for the care of 
wounded soldiers if a major war broke out overseas. U.S. officials 
explained this conclusion by stating that participation in the CMCHS 
program is a violation of California's privacy laws, and, in addition, 
U.C. hospitals already sustain programs which provide health care ser-
vices in the event of a national emergency. 
A final example includes the decision of the president of Mary's 
Help Hospital, Daly City, California. The hospital rescinded its earlier 
commitment to participate in the CMCHS program because" ... [we] 
do not wish to deceive the public into thinking that there can be 
effective medical response in the event of a thermonuclear 
attack .... (A) future war could escalate to the point of using tactical 
nuclear weapons .... " 
These examples picture well the general reasons why many hos-
pitals are refusing to participate in the CMCHS program: 
1) the international climate increasingly accepts nuclear war as a 
rational possibility; 
2) in the U.S. there is an escalating race to produce weapons for 
nuclear war; 
3) conventional war would inevitably lead to the use of tactical 
nuclear weapons; 
4) hospitals already sustain programs to care for people hurt in a 
national emergency; and 
5) participation in the CMCHS program deceives the public into 
thinking that there can be an effective response to a thermo-
nuclear attack. 
Department of Defense Response 
The Department of Defense has responded in various ways to this 
general decision on the part of many hospitals not to cooperate with 
the CMCHS program. 
In June of 1981, John H. Moxley III, M.D. called the CMCHS a 
"contingency plan ... to ensure that appropriate medical care is avail-
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able should we ever become engaged in an overseas conflict which 
results in more casualties than we can care for within the Federal 
health care system." Dr. Moxley then writes: 
In principle, it [the CMCHS program 1 is designed to accommodate casual-
ties which might result from a war involving modern, conventional weapons. 
It is possible, of course, that such a war could escalate to the use of chem-
ical or tactical weapons within a combat theater. 
This same basic principle was enunciated by Moxley in May of 1981: 
. .. (T)he most likely scenario for a future military conflict would be in an 
overseas area using conventional weapons. This does not rule out the possi-
bility that such a war could escalate to a tactical nuclear exchange and 
planning must, of course, consider that possibility. 
In November of 1981, J. Alexander McMahon, president of the 
American Hospital Association defended the CMCHS program on 
other grounds: 
Rather than developing a standby military hospital system, this use of 
civilian facilities makes good economic sense, and it is an excellent prece-
dent in government-private cooperation . . . . The government of the United 
States has decided that there must be a "medical response" to members of 
the armed forces injured abroad, and to believe that refusal to participate in 
the CMCHS can deter nuclear war is a position I cannot understand. 
In January of 1982, Major V ojtasko wrote to the California Cath-
olic Conference: 
From its inception, the CMCHS was designed as a contingency plan to 
respond to an overseas conflict using conventional weapons and does not 
assume the treatment of casualties from a nuclear confrontation. The use of 
the phrase "advanced weaponry" in some of the written material on the 
program does not include nuclear weapons systems. 
As a final example, Brigadier General William P. Winkler, Jr., M.D., 
commanding officer for the Department of the Army of Lettermen 
Army Medical Center in the Presidio of San Francisco wrote this 
response to the decision of Mary's Help Hospital in Daly City, Califor-
nia, to withdraw participation in the CMCHS program: 
. .. (W)ar ... is a tragic waste of human life and human energies. I find no 
moral difference between clubs, bullets or nuclear radiation when we are 
talking about destroying young lives. You should realize that there are few 
professional soldiers who do not share these views. One wonders why they 
are then professional soldiers. It is perhaps an over simplification but I think 
that the reason is an awareness that there comes a time in the course of 
human events when political and diplomatic solutions are exhausted. At 
that time, somebody must be willing to sacrifice himself for the benefit of 
those who remain behind. You must realize that the military does not go to 
war unless the President and the Congress send it. The military does not 
defend the kind of war it must fight any more than the fireman defines the 
kind of fire that he must fight. Like the fireman, we must be prepared for 
all contingencies and on the day the fire starts, it is too late to prepare or 
plan on how to put out the fire .... 
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If our President and Congress find it necessary to commit U.S. soldiers to 
battle, whether it be a large scale conflict in Europe or smaller scale in the 
Persian Gulf or Central America, I can only conclude that large numbers of 
casualties will be returning to the U.S. CMCHS is an attempt to be prepared 
to adequately care for these soldiers who will have sacrificed themselves so 
that others might enjoy the ir peaceful pursuits here at home. 
What conclusions can be drawn from these responses? 
1) the CMCHS is a contingency plan to supplement federal health 
care systems; 
2) the CMCHS assumes the use of conventional weapons but 
admits the possibility of escalation to the use of chemical or 
tactical nuclear weapons; 
3) it is economically more feasible to employ the CMCHS program; 
4) the CMCHS program is an excellent precedent in government-
private cooperation; and 
5) the CMCHS assumes the use of conventional weaponry and 
abhors the use of war but recognizes that once war occurs, there 
is "no moral difference" between conventional weapons and 
nuclear warfare. 
The Vatican and the Use of Nuclear Weapons 
In October, 1981, under the chairmanship of Prof. Carlos Chagas, (j 
president of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences (Vatican City), a 
group of 14 specialized scientists from various parts of the world 
assembled to examine the problem of the consequences of the use of 
nuclear weapons on the survival and health of humanity. 6 This group 
of scientists issued a statement which is a clear assertion that the 
conditions of life following a nuclear attack would be so severe that .: 
the only hope for humanity is prevention of any form of nuclear war. 
Several quotations from this statement are pertinent: 
Recent talk about winning or even surving a nuclear war must reflect a 
failure to appreciate a medical reality : any nuclear war would inevitably 
cause death , disease and suffering of pandemic proportions and without the 
possibility of effective medical in terventions. That reality leads to the same 
conclusion physicians have reached for life·threatening epidemics through-
out history: prevention is essential for control .... 
(N)o one could delive r the medical service required by even a few of the 
severely burned, the crushed and the radiated victims ... . 
The suffering of the surviving population would be without parallel. 
There would be complete interruption of communications, of food supplies 
and of water. Help would be given only at the risk of mortal danger from 
radiation for those ven turing outside of buildings in the first few days. The 
social disrupt.ion following such an attack would be unimaginable .... 
Even a nuclear attack directed only at military fac ilities would be devas-
tating to the country as a whole. This is because military facilities are 
widespread rather than concentrated at only a few points. Thus, many 
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nuclear weapons would be exploded. Furthermore, the spread of radiation 
due to the natural winds and atmospheric mixing would kill vast numbers of 
people and contaminate large areas. The medical facilities of any nation 
would be inadequate to care for the survivors. An objective examination of 
the medical situation that would follow a nuclear war leads to but one 
conclusion: prevention is our only recourse .... 
(W)here treatment of a given disease is ineffective or where costs are 
insupportable, attention must be turned to prevention. Both conditions 
apply to the effects of nuclear war. Treatment would be virtually impossible 
and the costs would be staggering .... 
Conclusions 
It is apparent that the medical community and hospitals must con-
front this issue as one of the most significant moral concerns of all 
time. A clear statement is already emerging from the medical sector of 
society: the medical community is virtually impotent in offering any 
type of meaningful response to a nuclear attack. Silence at this point 
is a betrayal of ourselves and of our civilization. 
It is eminently clear from the combined responses of the Depart-
ment of Defense that although the CMCHS program as such assumes 
only the use of conventional weaponry in a war, escalation to the use 
of tactical nuclear weapons is possible. It is thus morally impossible to 
think any longer that a "pure" conventional war is feasible, when 
nuclear weaponry is de facto a back-up reality. Even admitting the 
possibility of only a conventional war, escalation to the employment 
of nuclear weapons is possible, as admitted by some members of the 
Department of Defense; and this type of employment cannot per se be 
limited to a tactical engagement. . 
It is a fitting moral conclusion, then, that the CMCHS subtly 
encourages preparations for a war of catastrophic proportions, a pro-
gram which too easily gives the general public the impression that 
there is an adequate medical response to war in the future, a war 
which cannot be in fact solely limited to conventional warfare. The 
• \ CMCHS handbook admits that "a future large scale war overseas will 
probably begin and end very rapidly and produce casualties at a higher 
rate than any other war in history." Is it really morally possible to 
differentiate the type of conflict described here from a nuclear war of 
some type, especially when General Winkler has stated that he sees "no 
moral difference between clubs, bullets or nuclear radiation .. . "? 
In light of this discussion and the facts presented in this paper, the 
threshold between conventional and nuclear violence is virtually non-
distinguishable, thus making the stance of the scientists gathered at 
the Pontifical Academy of Sciences eminently sensible: prevention is 
our only recourse; prevention is a moral exigency of the highest order. 
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Albert Einstein's insight has been frequently quoted in these 
debates; it is worth repeating here: 
The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything except our ways 
of thinking. Thus we are drifting toward a catastrophe beyond comparison . 
We shall require a substantially new manner of thinking if mankind is to 
survive. 
Achieving such a change in thinking is the key to survival in a 
nuclear age. This thinking must be applied to the moral consequences 
of the CMCHS program. 
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